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The situation of a truncated arbitral tribunal may becaused by various factors. It may arise when a three-member tribunal during the course of the arbitral
proceedings and before the rendering of the award does
not remain the same at some point, meaning that one of
the members of the tribunal dies, resigns or fails to attend
the proceedings or deliberations leaving the two other
members at the helm. In such a situation the following
questions arise: what is the authority of a truncated
tribunal? Can it go ahead and render a valid award? These
issues have arisen frequently before arbitral tribunals and
also before national courts at the stage of enforcement of
arbitral awards, and they have had a rough ride at both
levels. Arbitrators are often baffled with the prospect of the
enforcement of their awards whilst exercising their
authority as a truncated arbitral tribunal in the sense of the
proverbial puzzle: “to be or not to be, that is the question”,
ie whether or not to exercise the authority to go ahead with
the arbitration and render an award. The purpose here is
to examine the issues in light of modern international
arbitration law and practice as well as most recent relevant
domestic case law on arbitration, and to recommend some
pragmatic approaches for the safe course of action.
On the issue of the power of a truncated arbitral tribunal
the recent trends in international arbitration law and
practice seem to be converging (ie a truncated tribunal’s
authority to proceed), subject, however, to certain
institution-specific approaches to the issue as will be clear
from the following. Some international arbitration rules
such as the LCIA (1998), WIPO (2002), ICDR (2011),
PCA and JAMS (2011) invariably allow the truncated
arbitral tribunal itself to go ahead with the arbitration if the
situation arises at any stage. However, these rules have
provided some balancing factors for the tribunal to weigh
in determining whether to proceed or not. The common
ones are:
• the stage of the arbitration;
• the explanation given by the non-participating
arbitrator; and
• such other matters considered appropriate in the
circumstances of the case.
Some other arbitration rules such as UNCITRAL
(2010), ICC (2012), Swiss Rules on International
Arbitration (2012), and CIETAC (2012) specifically point
out the milestone that such a truncated situation will only
be considered after the closure of the hearings or
proceedings, meaning that the authority of the truncated
tribunal may ensue after that point is reached but not
before. And before that stage the defaulting arbitrator has
to be replaced. Some rules such as UNCITRAL, CIETAC,
Swiss, and ICC bestow the power to decide in such a
truncated situation on the appointing authority and not on
the tribunal itself. Thus, although modern international
arbitration law is in favour of the truncated tribunal
proceedings, the approach is not always straightforward as
there are some hurdles to overcome in the sense of
maintaining the balance of the situations.
It is noteworthy that in the UNCITRAL Model Law
(Arts 14 and 15) and the ICSID Convention (Art 56) the
truncated situation of the tribunal is dealt with differently.
The mechanisms used in them underscore the continued
cooperation and involvement of the members on a three-
member arbitral tribunal and its non-frustration and the
principles of expediency and immutability of the tribunal
are encouraged. In such a truncated situation the emphasis
under both the regimes is to fill in the vacancy by
reappointment within short-time limits, hence little
chance for a party for dilatory tactics. Thus, the Model Law
and the ICSID prescriptions reinforce the original
expectation of the parties that the decision be rendered by
a three-member tribunal, no matter what deviation from
that might have occurred after the commencement of the
arbitration and for whatever reason.
International arbitral case law and juristic views seem to
suggest a bias towards the tribunal’s authority to deal with
the truncated situation in the exclusive sense, perhaps for
the sake of the tribunal’s mission to settle disputes and its
duty to fulfil that mission expediently. The approach
appears to prove the tribunal’s inherent power to deal with
the matter on its own. In the Iran-US Claims Tribunals’
practice this approach appears to be consistent.
Furthermore, in the Himpurna case (1999) the remaining
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two arbitrators gave a short shrift to the objection to its
acting as a truncated tribunal in light of the existing
precedents and concluded that:
“The weight of well-established international authority makes
clear that an arbitral tribunal has not only the right, but the
obligation, to proceed when, without valid excuse, one of its
members fails to act, or withdraws or – although not the case
here – purports to resign.” [Final award of October 16,
1999 in ad hoc arbitration Himpurna California Energy Ltd
v Republic of Indonesia, XXV YBCA 186 (2000), 194].
This is in line with what the ICC tribunal expressed in
the award in Ivan Milutinovic PIM v Deutsche Babcock AG that
it is “more and more accepted that in international
commercial arbitration the possibility of delaying tactics is
a serious concern and the elimination of these effects is a
primary task of all involved.”
In reference to the Himpurna tribunal’s view quoted
above, Judge Schwebel opines that such a position of the
tribunal is “the better, but not the only, view of the matter”
(S Schwebel, “Injunction of Arbitral Proceedings and Truncation
of the Tribunal,” (2003) 18:4]. He also concluded in his
study on the subject that:
“While the precedents are not uniform, and the commentators
are divided, the weight of international authority, to which
the International Court of Justice has given its support, clearly
favours the authority of an international tribunal from which
an arbitrator has withdrawn to proceed and to render a valid
award.” [S Schwebel, Justice in International Law: Further
Selected Writings (CUP, 2011), p 206].
However, one has to be cautious in view of the recent
wave of national court cases (ie Swiss, French, Russian,
Chinese and US) where the enforcement of awards
rendered by truncated tribunals was declined irrespective
of whether an absentee or defaulting arbitrator was acting
with the purpose of sabotaging the proceedings, or the
truncated situation was caused by the death of an arbitrator
or by the formal resignation of an arbitrator, or his
participation in the arbitral proceedings was disabled by
other exterior factors. The ground for such refusal of
enforcement of awards was commonly found to be that an
award rendered by only two arbitrators was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties on a three-
member tribunal or in some cases contrary to the
principles of equality of treatment and equal representation
on the arbitral tribunal [eg Cour d’Appel, Paris, July 1, 1997;
Agence Transcongolaise des Communications – Chemin de fer Congo
Océan (ATC-CFCO) v Compagnie Minière de l’Ogooue – Comilog
SA, XXIVA YBCA, 281 (1999); Swiss Federal Court, Ivan
Milutinovic PIM v Deutsche Babcock AG – the ICC Court of
Arbitration in Case No 5017 (1987); First Investment Corp of
the Marshall Islands v Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd, 2012 WL
831536 (E.D. La. March 12, 2012)].
It is noteworthy that the courts of the traditionally
popular hubs of arbitration and pro-arbitration countries
such as Switzerland and France questioned the validity of a
truncated tribunal’s award.
In international arbitration case law and juristic views
the issue of truncated tribunal has been dealt with from the
tribunal’s own perspective, ie to give effect to the
considerations of expediency, efficiency of the process and
the accomplishment of the mission of dispute resolution.
While, on the other hand, at the other end of the scenario
when the award rendered by a truncated tribunal goes to
the enforcement stage before a national court, the
perspective turns out to be different which endorses the
parties’ original wish to get the dispute resolved by a three-
member arbitral tribunal.
What is then the takeaway from the above? Well,
international arbitrators need to be pragmatic to give a 360
degree approach to the issue as at the end of the day they
have to render an award that is enforceable. Thus, the
tribunal can take some careful steps as follows:
1. If the truncated situation arises for whatever reasons at
the beginning of the proceedings or at some stage
where disruption of the proceedings is reasonably
manageable, certainly replacement is inevitable unless
the parties have provided otherwise in their agreement.
2. If the truncated situation arises at an advanced stage or at
the close of the hearings, the absentee arbitrator, unless
he has formally resigned, should be kept informed of the
day-to-day developments of the proceedings and the
tribunal’s deliberations and his feedback on them should
be sought as from other members of the tribunal. In this
situation the tribunal will be considered to be a fully
constituted one and the absentee arbitrator will be
deemed to have had the opportunity to act as any other
member of the tribunal and the appointing party should
be informed of the situation and non-cooperation, if any.
In the circumstances, there is no reason why the tribunal
should not proceed to render an award given the
reasonable steps it has taken and the implications of time
and expense factors for the parties if it did otherwise.
3. If the truncated situation arises at an advanced stage of
the proceedings or at the close of the hearings because
of the sudden death of an arbitrator or his participation
is fully incapacitated by external factors, the reasonable
step for the tribunal will be to consult the parties as
well as the appointing authority and proceed
accordingly and to weigh with them the time and
expense factors and the expediency of the parties’
initial intention to get the dispute settled by a three-
member arbitral tribunal.
This is not to say that the above prescription fully rids a
truncated tribunal of its puzzle in some respects about the
prospect of the enforcement of its award by a national
court. It may, however, boost some confidence as logical
steps in the circumstances have been taken. 23
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• This article was published in Kluwer Arbitration blog,
July 2012.
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